| QUOTE (Free_World @ 16 Aug 2017, 14:46 ) | ვერ ვარ კაი ამბის მომტანი 
მიულერის ოფისი იკვლევს ტრამპის ფინანსურ მაქინაციებსაც, სადაც საქართველო და სააკაშვილიც ამიტივტივდა
ძალიან ცუდი კონტექსტით.
საქართველოში, ქალაქ ბათუმში სასტუმრო Trump Tower-ის მშენებლობაზე, იმ ადამიანს უნდა დაეფინანსებინა, რომელიც ყაზახი ოლიგარქების წრეებს მიეკუთვნებოდა, კერძოდ, თემურ ყილიბაევს - ყახაზეთის პრეზიდენტის ნურსულთან ნაზარბაევის სიძეს და რუსეთის პრეზიდენტის ვლადიმერ პუტინის ახლო თანამოაზრე პიროვნებას.
ყაზახ ბიზნესმენს ერთი მილიონი დოლარი გადაუხადეს სარეკლამო კამპანიისათვის, რომელიც საქართველოს იმდროინდელი პრეზიდენტის მიხეილ სააკაშვილის იმიჯის გაუმჯობესებისაკენ იყო მიმართული. იგი უნდა წარდგენილიყო როგორც ბიზნესის ხელშეწყობისაკენ ორიენტირებული რეფორმატორი, დასავლელი ფინანსისტების მიზიდვის მიზნით.
2012 წლის აპრილი, როცა დონალდ ტრამპი საქართველოს ეწვია, მიხეილ სააკაშვილისათვის "პოლიტიკურად მოწყვლადი პერიოდი" იყო: მისი ბრძოლა კორუფციის წინააღმდეგ პრაქტიკულად შეწყდა, ხოლო საზოგადოებრივმა ორგანიზაციებმა, მაგალითად, Transparency International-მა, დაიწყეს განცხადებების კეთება, რომ ქვეყანაში ფართოდ გავრცელდა "ელიტური კორუფცია".
ასეთ პირობებში მხოლოდ ცოტა დასავლელი ინვესტორი ან რომელიმე ბრენდული კომპანია თუ იქნებოდა მზად კაპიტალის დასაბანდებლად საქართველოში. "პრეზიდენტი მიხეილ სააკაშვილი პოპულარობას კარგავდა, დონალდ ტრამპის ამოცანას კი მისი რეპუტაციის გადარჩენა წარმოადგენდა
იხეილ სააკაშვილისა და დონალდ ტრამპის განცხადებებში სასტუმროს მშენებლობის თაობაზე, ფაქტობრივად, მართალი არაფერი იყო.
სტატიაში ნათქვამია, რომ დონალდ ტრამპს ფული კომპანია Silk Road Group-მა გადაუხადა, თვით ეს კომპანია B.T.A. Bank-მა დააფინანსა, რომელიც "გრანდიოზულ სკანდალში მოხვდა, ფულის გათეთრებასთან დაკავშირებით".
როგორც პუბლიკაციაშია აღნიშნული, 2005 წელს ნურსულთან ნაზარბაევმა განაცხადა, რომ B.T.A. Bank, რომელიც იმ დროს ყაზახეთის ყველაზე მსხვილი ბანკი იყო, საქართველოს რამდენიმე ასეული მილიონი დოლარის სესხს მისცემდა, ქვეყნის ეკონომიკის განვითარების მიზნით. საქართველოში ყველა კრედიტი ბანკის შვილობილი კომპანია Silk Road Group-ის მეშვეობით შედიოდა. 2009 წელს ყაზახეთის ხელისუფლებამ B.T.A. Bank-ი თავისი კონტროლის ქვეშ აიყვანა და მისი აქტივები სამართავად სახელმწიფო საინვესტიციო ფონდს გადასცა.
ყოველივე ამის შემდეგ თემურ ყულიბაევი ფონდის დირექტორად დაინიშნა. მას ჰქონდა დაშვება ბანკის შიდა დოკუმენტაციასთან, ფაქტიურად მისი მფლობელი გახდა. როგორც გაზეთი წერს, თემურ ყულიბაევი, უეჭველია, ყველას იცნობს, ვინც კი ბათუმის სასტუმროს მშენებლობის პროექტში მონაწილეობდა.
როგორც ცნობილია, ბათუმში 47-სართულიანი ცათამბჯენი სასტუმროს მშენებლობის შესახებ გადაწყვეტილება 2012 წელს მიიღეს, 2017 წლის იანვარში კი Trump Organization-მა და Silk Road Group-მა პროექტის შეჩერება გამოაცხადეს
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/trumps-business-of-corruption/amp
President Donald Trump’s attorney Jay Sekulow recently told me that the investigation being led by Robert Mueller, the special counsel appointed by the Justice Department, should focus on one question: whether there was “coördination between the Russian government and people on the Trump campaign.” Sekulow went on, “I want to be really specific. A real-estate deal would be outside the scope of legitimate inquiry.” If he senses “drift” in Mueller’s investigation, he said, he will warn the special counsel’s office that it is exceeding its mandate. The issue will first be raised “informally,” he noted. But if Mueller and his team persist, Sekulow said, he might lodge a formal objection with the Deputy Attorney General, Rod Rosenstein, who has the power to dismiss Mueller and end the inquiry. President Trump has been more blunt, hinting to the Times that he might fire Mueller if the investigation looks too closely at his business dealings.
Several news accounts have confirmed that Mueller has indeed begun to examine Trump’s real-estate deals and other business dealings, including some that have no obvious link to Russia. But this is hardly wayward. It would be impossible to gain a full understanding of the various points of contact between the Kremlin and the Trump campaign without scrutinizing many of the deals that Trump has made in the past decade. Trump-branded buildings in Toronto and the SoHo neighborhood of Manhattan were developed in association with people who have connections to the Kremlin. Other real-estate partners of the Trump Organization—in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and elsewhere—are now caught up in corruption probes, and, collectively, they suggest that the company had a pattern of working with partners who exploited their proximity to political power.
One foreign deal, a stalled 2011 plan to build a Trump Tower in Batumi, a city on the Black Sea in the Republic of Georgia, has not received much journalistic attention. But the deal, for which Trump was reportedly paid a million dollars, involved unorthodox financial practices that several experts described to me as “red flags” for bank fraud and money laundering; moreover, it intertwined his company with a Kazakh oligarch who has direct links to Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin. As a result, Putin and his security services have access to information that could put them in a position to blackmail Trump. (Sekulow said that “the Georgia real-estate deal is something we would consider out of scope,” adding, “Georgia is not Russia.”)
The waterfront lot where the Trump Tower Batumi was supposed to be built remains empty. A groundbreaking ceremony was held five years ago, but no foundation has been dug. Trump removed his name from the project shortly before assuming the Presidency; the Trump Organization called this “normal housekeeping.” When the tower was announced, in March, 2011, it was the centerpiece of a bold plan to transform Batumi from a seedy port into a glamorous city. But the planned high-rise—forty-seven stories containing lavish residences, a casino, and expensive shops—was oddly ambitious for a town that had almost no luxury housing.
Trump did very little to develop the Batumi property. The project was a licensing deal from which he made a quick profit. In exchange for the million-dollar payment, he granted the right to use his name, and he agreed to visit Georgia for an elaborate publicity campaign, which was designed to promote Georgia’s President at the time, Mikheil Saakashvili, as a business-oriented reformer who could attract Western financiers. The campaign was misleading: the Trump Tower Batumi was going to be funded not by Trump but by businesses with ties to Kazakh oligarchs, including Timur Kulibayev, the son-in-law of Kazakhstan’s autocratic ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and a close ally of Putin. Kazakhstan has the largest economy in Central Asia, based on its vast reserves of oil and metals, among other natural resources. Kazakhstan is notoriously corrupt, and much of its wealth is in the hands of Nazarbayev’s extended family and his favored associates.
Trump visited Georgia in April, 2012, at a politically vulnerable time for Saakashvili. Nine years earlier, Saakashvili had led the Rose Revolution, which overturned the country’s autocratic post-Soviet leadership. After assuming power, he initially cracked down on widespread petty corruption and cleaned up the civil service, which had functi0ned largely on bribes. Then, in 2008, he led a disastrous war against Russia over control of the breakaway region of South Ossetia. By then, his fight against corruption had largely ceased, and Transparency International and other N.G.O.s were reporting that élite corruption—in which wealthy, politically connected people receive better treatment from courts, prosecutors, and government administrators—was rampant in Georgia. Under these conditions, few Western investors or brands were willing to put money into the country. Saakashvili himself was increasingly unpopular, and the Trump deal was meant to help salvage his reputation.
Saakashvili showed Trump around Tbilisi, the capital, and Batumi. Georgian television covered the events fawningly, promising viewers that Trump would soon build a second tower, in Tbilisi. One broadcaster proclaimed that Trump was the world’s top developer. At the groundbreaking ceremony in Batumi, Saakashvili said that the tower was “a big deal . . . that changes everything around here.” At another event, beneath a banner that proclaimed “trump invests in georgia,” he thanked Trump for being part of the project—which, he said, had a budget of two hundred and fifty million dollars. He also awarded Trump the Georgian Order of Brilliance. Trump, in turn, praised Saakashvili. “Everybody in the world, they speak of Georgia and the great miracle that’s taking place,” he said.
Upon returning home, Trump appeared on “Fox and Friends.” Gretchen Carlson, the host at the time, asked him, “What are you going to be investing in?” He responded, “I’m doing a big development there—and it’s been amazing.” He said of Saakashvili, “He’s one of the great leaders of the world.”
Virtually none of the things that Saakashvili and Trump said about the deal were true. The budget of the Trump Tower Batumi was not two hundred and fifty million dollars but a hundred and ten. Trump, meanwhile, could hardly have invested such a sum himself. He professed to be a billionaire, but a few months earlier an appeals court in New Jersey had shut down Trump’s legal campaign against Timothy O’Brien, the author of “TrumpNation,” which argued that Trump had wildly inflated his fortune, and was actually worth less than a quarter of a billion dollars. Julie George, a political scientist at Queens College who studies Georgia, told me that, by 2012, Saakashvili’s tenure could in no way be considered a “great miracle.” The country’s economy was floundering, and shortly after Trump’s visit it was revealed that the government had been torturing political opponents. (Saakashvili did not respond to requests for comment.)
The announcement of the Batumi tower was handled with cynical opportunism by both Trump and Saakashvili, but that was not the deal’s biggest problem. The developer that had paid Trump and invited him to Georgia—a holding company known as the Silk Road Group—had been funded by a bank that was enmeshed in a giant money-laundering scandal. And Trump, it seemed, had not asked many questions before taking the money.
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991, Batumi had been a popular resort town, but by the early aughts it had fallen into disrepair. Its beachfront hotels housed refugees from the nearby Abkhazia region, which had broken away from Georgia in 1992. Batumi was the capital of the semiautonomous Adjara region, which was itself on the verge of declaring independence. Saakashvili saw the redevelopment of Batumi as critical for maintaining Georgian sovereignty there. Batumi residents promised to turn the city into the Monaco of the Black Sea.
But nobody seemed willing to put money into Batumi. Levan Varshalomidze, the governor of Adjara at the time, told me that Saakashvili and other Georgian officials sought financial backers, but they could not get anyone to invest in a run-down Georgian port.
Then, in 2005, something remarkable happened. Saakashvili and President Nazarbayev, of neighboring Kazakhstan, announced that B.T.A. Bank—the largest bank in Kazakhstan—was giving several hundred million dollars in loans to help develop Georgia. The loans would pay for the construction of hotels in Batumi, the expansion of the Georgian telecommunications industry, and the growth of a Georgian bank. Curiously, all the loans went to subsidiaries of one company: the Silk Road Group, which specialized not in real-estate development but in shipping crude- and refined-oil products, by rail, from Kazakhstan to other countries. Its senior executives had very little experience in telecommunications, banking, or hospitality. The Silk Road Group, which had annual revenues of roughly two hundred million dollars, was planning, in an instant, to venture into several new industries. Compounding the risk, this expansion involved taking on a debt one and a half times its annual revenue.
That wasn’t the only puzzling thing about the loans. At the time that B.T.A. was lending all this money to the Silk Road Group, the bank’s deputy chairman, Yerkin Tatishev, was apparently crossing an ethical line—positioning himself to exert improper influence over some of the very Silk Road Group subsidiaries that were benefitting from the loans. B.T.A. Bank had representatives on the boards of those subsidiaries, but one representative serving on two boards, Talgat Turumbayev, was simultaneously working for Tatishev’s company, the Kusto Group, supervising mergers and acquisitions. (Turumbayev told me that serving on the boards wasn’t a conflict of interest, because it didn’t take “a lot of time.”)
I spoke with people who had knowledge about the subsidiaries. They told me that the subsidiaries were co-owned by the Silk Road Group and secret partners. The source at one subsidiary told me he suspected that Tatishev—who repeatedly participated in company meetings—was a hidden owner.
Tatishev, who is estimated by Forbes to be worth half a billion dollars, left B.T.A. Bank in 2009. He insisted to me that, while he was there, he had no personal financial involvement in the Silk Road Group. But he acknowledged that he “developed a strong friendship” with George Ramishvili, the company’s C.E.O., and “offered to advise him.” He added, “It was the right thing to do, and this is my definition of friendship.” But is it true that Tatishev merely advised the Silk Road Group? The Web site of Tatishev’s company, the Kusto Group, declares that it has been “an outstanding partner for the Silk Road Group” since 2006, noting, “Together we have successfully invested in various sectors of the Georgian economy.” Whenever I pointed out such contradictions to Tatishev, he came up with new answers. In an e-mail, he said that the joint investments were simply “charity/heritage projects.” After he told me that he never served on the committee of B.T.A. Bank that oversees lending, I checked, and confirmed that this was false. He then insisted that he “did not recall” participating.
If, as the Web site suggests, Tatishev financially involved himself in businesses funded by the B.T.A. Bank loans, then he and the Silk Road Group may well have committed bank fraud. When bank executives have a personal financial stake in projects that their own bank is financing, it is known as “self-dealing,” and it is a crime in nearly every country, including Kazakhstan. I recently spoke with Sergei Gretsky, a professor at the Catholic University of America, who wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on the Kazakh banking sector. When I asked him if it would be illegal for the deputy chairman of a Kazakh bank to have personal investments in a project that his bank was funding and withhold that information from investors, he laughed and said, “Yes, of course.”
Richard Gordon, the director of the financial-integrity unit at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, explained that self-dealing represented a central cause of the 1997 global financial crisis. Banks in Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, Russia, Pakistan, and Taiwan failed, in part, because bank executives and board members kept lending money to themselves and to their cronies. “This leads to defaults, bank bankruptcies, or government bailouts,” he said. Since then, nearly every nation has made efforts to prevent self-dealing. Gordon said that, at most banks today, the board members and senior staff don’t even have a credit card associated with the bank, in order to eliminate any appearance of a conflict of interest.
Lending to companies in which a senior bank executive has a personal stake is a crime because it violates the central trust that makes banking possible. The fundamental business of banking is to borrow money from one group and lend it to another. B.T.A., which had been heralded internationally as a fast-growing bank in a troubled part of the world, had raised money by selling bonds through J. P. Morgan, Credit Suisse, and many other top Western banks. If these Western banks had known that a senior B.T.A. official was heavily involved in the operations of a company that was receiving huge loans from B.T.A., they might have balked.
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ხელი აიწიეთ, ვისთვის არის ეს ყველაფერი ახალი ამბავი?  |
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თან 3 პასპორტი აქვს. იშშშშ 
არადა ეგეთი მასწავლებელი მყავდა,ეგეც რაღაცეებს წერდა,კიდე ბჟუტურობდა ბევრ რამეს, სულ მიყვარდა.
