ჰუმან რაითსი რუსებს (და ჩვენც) სისხლს უშრობს
Russia/Georgia: Investigate Abuse of DetaineesAllegations of Execution, Torture in South Ossetia
(Moscow September 21, 2008) – Russia should immediately investigate allegations of extrajudicial execution, torture, and other abuse of Georgian military and civilian detainees by Ossetian forces during the recent conflict in Georgia, Human Rights Watch said today. Georgia should investigate alleged ill-treatment of Ossetian detainees during their detention and transfer to Tbilisi and improve conditions of detention, Human Rights Watch said.
“The torture and ill-treatment of Georgian detainees is abhorrent and can’t be justified, even during armed conflict,” said Rachel Denber, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Russia had effective control in South Ossetia while these abuses took place and it has the duty to hold the perpetrators to account for these horrific crimes.”
In interviews with former Georgian military detainees, Human Rights Watch has documented at least one extrajudicial execution of a Georgian soldier in detention, as well as severe torture of at least four Georgian soldiers by Ossetian militia and other Ossetian forces.
Human Rights Watch also found that Russian and Ossetian forces unlawfully detained at least 160 civilians, mainly elderly, in South Ossetia and Gori district; approximately 40 were women. At least one man was executed while in Ossetian custody. Most civilians were held in the basement of the Ossetian Ministry of Interior building in Tskhinvali for approximately two weeks in conditions that amounted to degrading treatment. Some were subjected to beatings and were forced to work cleaning the streets of Tskhinvali of decomposing bodies of Georgian soldiers and building debris. At least four Georgian civilians were held by Russian military forces in a dirt pit and beaten at what appeared to be a Russian field base before being handed over to the Ossetian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ossetian forces had no legal authority to detain military service personnel or civilians.
The Georgian military detained Ossetians during the active fighting in South Ossetia. The Georgian ministry of defense claims that it detained only militia fighters or others posing security risks. Human Rights Watch spoke to two of the detainees, one traffic policeman and another male who claimed that he had not taken any part in hostilities. Both men reported that they were ill-treated as they were being transferred from South Ossetia to Tbilisi and complained of poor food during detention.
“Georgia has an obligation to investigate allegations that Ossetian detainees were beaten during their transfer to custody,” Denber said. “Poor detention conditions in Georgia are a long-standing problem that the government has taken insufficient steps to address.”
Of 13 Georgian military servicemen known to have been detained by Ossetian and Russian forces, Human Rights Watch conducted individual, in-depth interviews with four. Human Rights Watch also interviewed more than 20 civilians detained by Ossetian and Russian forces as well as two Ossetians and two Russian soldiers detained by the Georgian military.
Execution and torture of Georgian military servicemen
The Georgian military servicemen interviewed by Human Rights Watch were detained by Ossetian militias on August 8, 2008, during the active fighting in Tskhinvali. They were held in informal places of detention, including apartment buildings and schools, for several days, and were then transferred to Ossetian forces, who detained the soldiers for six days. Russian forces were aware of the detentions.
The four Georgian soldiers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, together with nine other Georgian soldiers and two people the Georgian authorities claim were civilians, were exchanged by the Russian authorities for five Russian prisoners of war on August 21. Because the Georgian soldiers were detained in Tskhinvali in South Ossetia, an area over which Russia exercised effective control since August 9, they should be treated as having fallen into Russia's power. Russia was therefore obligated to afford them prisoner-of-war (POW) status and to treat them in conformity with the protections of the Third Geneva Convention, which include absolute prohibitions on ill-treatment and require POWs to be treated humanely and kept in good health.
Georgian soldiers reported that they had been subjected to severe torture and ill-treatment throughout their detention by Ossetian militia and Ossetian forces. The Ossetian militia and other forces frequently beat the soldiers, not only by punching and kicking them, but also by using implements such as hammers, butts of machine guns, and metal rods. They also burned their skin with lighters, starved them and threatened them with execution. The men were held in degrading conditions, given very little water and little to no food after the initial days of their detention. The torture and ill-treatment caused severe head trauma, broken bones, burns, severe bruising, and serious dehydration and loss of weight among the prisoners. After several days in detention by Ossetian forces, one Georgian soldier who had been wounded during active fighting in Tskhinvali was taken into custody by Russian federal forces proper and treated in hospitals in South Ossetia and Russia.
The Georgian soldiers also reported that one of the soldiers detained with them was executed. Shortly after the soldiers were detained in a school, one soldier was taken from the group into a small room and shot in the back of the head with automatic weapon fire. Other soldiers were made to carry the body outside and later bury it. The man was apparently singled out because he was a tank driver. Georgian soldiers also stated that another Georgian military serviceman detained among them, who was ethnic Ossetian, was taken away during their detention. They never saw this soldier again. One Georgian soldier reported that he had been told the man was killed “as a traitor.”
For information on the extrajudicial execution by Ossetian forces of an armed Georgian man in a separate incident, see
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/13/russia19620.htm.
Execution, arbitrary detention, and ill-treatment of Georgian civilians
As Russian forces began to occupy South Ossetia on August 8-9, South Ossetian forces followed them into ethnic Georgian villages. Russian and Ossetian forces detained many of the remaining residents, most of whom were elderly and had stayed behind to protect their homes and property; younger family members had fled in the initial days of fighting. On subsequent days, Ossetian forces also detained people trying to flee looting and burning by Ossetian forces in the Gori district. Human Rights Watch has also documented how Ossetian forces looted and burned houses in Georgian villages (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/28/georgi19712.htm ). There is no evidence that the civilians detained by Russian and Ossetian forces posed any security threat that would necessitate their detention.
During the detention of approximately 10 men, who were taken from cars while attempting to flee from villages in the Gori district, one detainee was executed by Ossetian forces. The group of detainees had been made to lie face down in the back of a minivan, were kicked and hit with gun butts, and told not to raise their heads, despite the beatings. One detainee told Human Rights Watch that the young man lying next to him, who was approximately 25 years old, raised his head several times and the Ossetian captors eventually shot him in the head three times. They threw his body out of the van and threatened the other detainees, “We will kill you all eventually.” These men were subsequently taken to the Ossetian Ministry of Interior building in Tskhinvali.
At least 160 Georgian civilians, including many elderly and approximately 40 women, were held together in the basement of the Ossetian Ministry of Interior building in Tskhinvali. Detainees described appalling conditions of detention. They stated that the dark, hot, poorly ventilated basement had five detention cells designed for short-term detentions. The cells quickly became overcrowded, and detainees were forced to sleep in the hallway or in the small, fenced-in, outdoor exercise yard accessible from the basement. There were only a handful of beds, and most detainees slept sitting or lying on the floor.
There was one toilet for all detainees and it frequently did not have water. Detainees described being given water that was dirty as well as insufficient food. During the initial days of detention, guards would throw four to five loaves of bread into the cells, saying “Eat, pigs!” Detainees stated that following a visit by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in mid-August, they were given slightly more and better food, including buckwheat cereal, more servings of bread, and tea. Most detainees reported losing significant weight during the detention. Material conditions in Tskhinvali at the time of these detentions were dire; the city had no electricity, very little food, and very little water.
Several men reported being beaten at the moment of detention, during transfer, and upon their arrival at the detention facility. Several men were also forced to work, which included recovering decomposing bodies from the streets of Tskhinvali, digging graves, and burying bodies, as well as cleaning the streets from building debris accumulated as a result of fighting. They did not receive any compensation for this work. Under international humanitarian law, civilians may be required to work if it is necessary, for example, to maintain public utilities or to meet humanitarian needs, but they should be appropriately compensated for their work. Unpaid or abusive forced labor, or work that amounts to partaking in military operations, is strictly prohibited.
One group of 61 detainees, including most of the elderly and all of the women, were released on August 21, and were officially exchanged for eight detainees whom the Georgian military describes as militia fighters. Other civilians were released on subsequent days, including a large group of 81 civilians on August 27, who, according to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, were exchanged for four people detained during fighting and described as militants, as well as nine Ossetians previously convicted for crimes and serving sentences in Georgian prisons.
Detention and ill-treatment of Ossetians by Georgian military
Human Rights Watch interviewed two Ossetians detained by the Georgian military in Khetagurovo, a village in South Ossetia, on August 9. Both detainees reported being beaten by Georgian soldiers at the moment of their detention. One detainee stated that his jaw was dislocated as a result of the beatings. The other detainee told Human Rights Watch that Georgian soldiers punched and kicked him during his transfer by car to Tbilisi. Both detainees complained about poor and inadequate food during their detention in the Vaziani military base in Tbilisi. Neither detainee complained of ill-treatment while in detention. Human Rights Watch has documented poor conditions in Georgian prisons and places of detention and has called on the government to ensure conditions meet international standards.
კიდევ ერთი სტატია იმაზე თუ როგორ ჩაუჯვა კომპოტში პატარა საქართველომ დიდ დასავლეთს...
Small allies, big headacheshttp://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/o...0,5944385.storyMajor powers have to be wary lest friendly nations lead them down a slippery slope to conflict.
Small allies bear close watching. We now know that, earlier this year, U.S. diplomats saw tensions rising between Georgia and Russia over the disputed enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recognized that Washington had few levers to pull should the situation get out of hand. So they advised Georgian officials not to provoke the growling bear. But the cautionary message was weak and undercut by other administration signals of strong backing for Tbilisi.
Eventually, the Georgian government took matters into its own hands, Russia got the pretext it sought for some calculated thuggery, and the result was a geopolitical fiasco that left everybody worse off.
The crisis was a classic example of what economists call "moral hazard" -- the fact that offering insurance to somebody often leads them to take greater risks than they otherwise would. If Georgia had not been led to believe that the United States might back it in a crisis, it probably would have played its hand more carefully -- and whatever compromises it might have had to make, it would have been better off as a result. This sort of thing happens all the time, and shows why great powers need to be careful lest their dependents embroil them in unnecessary conflicts.
Ironically, the Bush administration sometimes demonstrates that it understands well both the problem and the solution -- as can be seen by its skillful handling of Taiwan, another plucky little democracy embroiled in a territorial dispute with a revanchist authoritarian neighbor.
Ever since President Nixon's opening to China, Taiwan has posed a quandary for American foreign policy. The mainland considers it a renegade province waiting to be retaken, but the United States has strong historical, moral and practical ties to Taiwan's thriving capitalist democracy. Successive U.S. administrations have finessed the problem by kicking the can down the road, hoping that eventually the two local parties might agree on a peaceful solution. Until then, Washington's policy of "strategic ambiguity" is designed to deter both sides from radical moves that might upset the status quo and trigger a war.
In practice, this means signaling to China that Washington will help Taiwan defend itself against an unprovoked attack while simultaneously making sure Taiwan avoids serious provocations (such as a formal declaration of independence). The policy is somewhere between pure realpolitik (which would control risks by cutting loose a strategic nuisance) and pure idealism (which would grant a vibrant democracy routine rights of self-determination regardless of the consequences). It is actually a fine example of the distinctive "American realism" that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sometimes touts.
Interestingly, when neoconservatives pushed to overturn the policy in favor of a more full-throated and unconditional support of Taiwan, the Bush administration paid them little heed. And when Taiwan seemed on the verge of declaring independence a few years ago, the Bush team came down hard behind the scenes to stop the move in its tracks -- something that helps explain why this perennial flash point has been absent from newspaper front pages in recent years.
Such a "tough love" approach to independent-minded junior partners has often been a valued part of the American diplomatic arsenal, deployed by policymakers determined to keep control over sensitive situations. In 1973, for example, the Nixon administration kept Israel from destroying the surrounded Egyptian 3rd Army at the end of the Yom Kippur War, thus avoiding a superpower confrontation while paving the way for an eventual settlement. And in 1991, the George H.W. Bush administration restrained Israel from retaliating for Iraqi missile strikes during the Persian Gulf War, thus keeping its broad coalition intact throughout the conflict.
Bush 41's move is particularly instructive. In addition to giving the Israelis some Patriot missiles to shoot down the incoming Scud missiles, Washington refused to provide Israel with the codes that would have allowed its planes to cross safely over American-controlled "no-fly-zone" airspace in order to strike Iraq. Experts disagree about whether it would be just as easy to prevent Israel from launching a rogue attack on the Iranian nuclear program today, but the precedent is clear: Should the U.S. and Israel disagree about the wisdom of a preventive counter-proliferation strike, the latter's view need not prevail.
Public discourse about foreign policy tends to be simplistic to the point of caricature -- seeing it as a matter of separating good guys from bad guys, friends from enemies, and supporting the former while confronting the latter. This was captured perfectly in vice presidential candidate Gov. Sarah Palin's recent interview with Charlie Gibson on ABC. Pressed about the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran, she gave the same answer three times in a row: "We are friends with Israel, and I don't think we should second-guess the measures that Israel has to take to defend themselves and for their security."
But professionals know that the real world is often more complex, that nations have differing interests, and major powers have to be wary about letting even friendly good guys lead them down a slippery slope into trouble. That is why, contra Palin, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen have been quietly doing what they can this year to block the possibility of an independent Israeli strike against Iran, to the dismay of many in the Israeli security establishment.
It is only natural for small democratic states living in bad neighborhoods to seek American support and protection, and in certain cases it is entirely appropriate for the United States to give it to them. But when it chooses to do so, the U.S. should make clear that along with the backing comes the responsibility to act prudently -- and should, without sentiment, use all the tools at its disposal to enforce the deal. The Bush 43 team has recognized this in Asia but forgot it in the Caucasus. How forcefully it would handle a third such case in the Middle East during its final months remains unclear.
Gideon Rose is the managing editor of Foreign Affairs.
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Убийство владельца Ингушетия.ру заказал президент республики - редакцияhttp://korrespondent.net/russia/591790Друзья убитого владельца сайта Ингушетия.ру Магомеда Евлоева провели собственное расследование его гибели. Результат расследования - публикация имен 14-ти человек, причастных к убийству. Среди них - президент Ингушетии и министр внутренних дел республики.
Ингушетия.ру воссоздала хронологию событий.
31 августа в 11 часов утра президент Ингушетии Мурат Зязиков позвонил начальнику своей охраны и двоюродному брату Русланбеку Зязикову и, сообщив что с ним на самолете вылетает владелец Ингушетии.ру Магомед Евлоев, приказал его уничтожить.
Тут же Зязиков приехал к Камбулату Медову (дядя министра МВД Ингушетии), в доме которого находилось много людей пришедших на свадьбу его сына.
Зязиков связался с начальником охраны Медова Ибрагимом Евлоевым и через него позвал министра МВД РИ Муссу Медова, который в это время сидел за столом. Через 15 минут разговора в машине трое, не попрощавшись с родственниками, уезжают со свадьбы.
Дав поручение Евлоеву собрать банду для участия в убийстве владельца сайта Ингушетия.ru, Медов вызвал к себе начальника ГОВД Назрани Ахмеда Котиева, который должен был опознать Магомеда Евлоева в случае если владелец сайта не откликнулся бы на свое имя в самолете и должен был сфабриковать задержание. Котиев, в свою очередь, для подготовки материалов для задержания Магомеда Евлоева вызвал следователя ГОВД Назрани Джабраила Шанхоева.
В это время Ибрагим Евлоев созывает своих подчиненных и пресекает попытку некоторых сотрудников "увильнуть" от участия в преступлении. Один из подчиненных Магомед Оздоев сказал, что отдыхает в выходной день и у него сейчас нет оружия, на что Ибрагим Евлоев ответил что даст ему оружие и, отобрав автомат у первого встречного милиционера, стоявшего на КПП, передал его Оздоеву.
Другой охранник - Хаваж Аушев в это время был на больничном, но ему позвонил Ибрагим Евлоев, который сказал, что он будет нужен для задержания очень важного человека.
После захвата владельца оппозиционного сайта, Ибрагим Евлоев, позвонив по дороге министру МВД Ингушетии Медову, сказал: "мы его кончили", на что Медов ответил: "Бросьте его у больницы и быстро ко мне". Сотрудники аппарата МВД РИ видели как забрызганные кровью Магомеда Евлоева убийцы поднялись в кабинет министра МВД Ингушетии.
Редакция отмечает, что согласно ингушским обычаям, под кровной местью оказались все те, кто причастен к убийству Магомеда Евлоева, а список убийц открывает президент Ингушетии Мурат Зязиков:
1. Мурат Зязиков - Президент Ингушетии.
2. Русланбек Зязиков - начальник охраны Мурата Зязикова
3. Муса Медов - министр внутренних дел Ингушетии.
4. Ибрагим Евлоев - начальник охраны Мусы Медова, родной племянник участвовал в похищении журналистов РЕН-ТВ и в обстреле домовладений лидеров оппозиции, а также в других преступлениях.
5. Ахмед Котиев - Начальник ГОВД г.Назрань, бывший сосед Магомеда Евлоева в г.Малгобек.
6. Шанхоев Джабраил – следователь ГОВД Назрани (Ахмедом Котиевым было обещано повышение звания за участие в преступлении).
7. Аушев Хаваж Хизирович – охранник Медова,родной племянник Медова, находился в УАЗе в котором убили Магомеда Евлоева.
8.Албогачиев Беслан - командир отделения ОМОНа МВД РИ.Находился в день убийства Магомеда Евлоева в машине сопровождения Медова. Принимал участие в похищение журналистов РенТВ, а также в обстерел домовладений лидеров Народного Протеста.
9. Магомед Оздоев – охранник Мусы Медова. Работал три месяца. В данное время уволился.
10. Насруддин Дударов - охранник Мусы Медова. Проживает в с.Кантышево. Его младший брат работает сотрудником ГОВД Назрани.
12. Башир Бадиев - Заместитель начальника СОБРа МВД РИ (племянник Мусы Медова).Проживает в г. Карабулак.
13. Батыр Медов – нынешний начальник охраны Медова.
14. Медов Тимур Магомедович - заместитель начальника ОСБ МВД РИ. Находился за рулем "Мерседеса" Медова.
Имена ещё двоих человек причастных убийству пока неизвестны,.
Согласно неподтвержденной информации, Бадиев, Аушев, Евлоев Ибрагим и еще четвертый пока неустановленный за убийство Магомеда Евлоева получили, от Медова, каждый по 100 тыс. долларов.
Евлоев неоднократно заявлял о давлении, оказываемом на него властями с требованием закрыть портал.
* * *
დაგადალის ბლინ
В Грузии создан Конгресс народов КавказаВ Тбилиси учреждена неправительственная организация «Конгресс народов Кавказа».
Как сообщил журналистам один из инициаторов создания НПО, лидер партии «Наша страна» Тамаз Гугунишвили, целью Конгресса народов Кавказа является объединение кавказских народов, их сближение.
«Наша организация будет работать над восстановлением традиционных, исторических связей между кавказскими народами, сохранением-воссозданием этнической самобытности этих народов, их культуры, духовных ценностей», - сказал Гугунишвили.
По его словам, Конгресс народов Кавказа «будет вести работу и против российской империалистической политики в регионе».
This post has been edited by Nachkebia on 21 Sep 2008, 13:32 
ახალი ინფორმაცია, მხოლოდ აქ!
