ესტონეთის თავდაცვის სამინისტროს შემაჯამებელი სტატია. რეალისტური სტრატეგია დასახეს უკრაინის წარმატებისთვის.
მოკლედ მთელი 2024 წელი მზადების წელი უნდა იყოს. ბევრად მეტი ფოკუსი უკრაინის არმიის მეტდა უფრო სრულყოფილ წვრთვნაზე, მეტი ამუნიცია, ჰსთ, დრონი, მეტი მკვდარი რუსი, და ამ ყველაფრისთვის დასავლეთის პოლიტიკური ნება(:DDD)
მოკლედ, სჯობს გვიან ვიდრე არასდროს.
Setting Transatlantic Defence up for Success: A Military Strategy for Ukraine’s Victory and Russia’s Defeat
https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default...r_success_0.pdfthere is ample capacity to scale up training, but even more so – increase and focus on setting and implementing new qualitative targets to the Armed Forces of Ukraine to fiffiight properly at battalion, brigade and higher echelon levels.
Ukraine has succeeded in killing or severely wounding at least 50,000 Russian troops per every six months on the battlefield. By redoubling our military support efforts, the attrition pace of Russian manpower and particularly the associated military equipment is bound to accelerate to unsustainable levels for Russia, whilst simultaneously decreasing Ukraine’s attrition. From a historic and strategic perspective, this cost to the Euro-Atlantic community of further arming and training Ukraine and accelerating investments into defense is both affordable and sustainable. The defeat of Russian forces in Ukraine and the maximal attrition of its military is also a direct means of lowering the threshold of what is needed to achieve conventional deterrence in Europe. And lastly, the increased investment commitments into defense will directly translate into accelerated and expanded defense-industrial output that is urgently required to address the threats and adversarial powers across the globe.
Setting transatlantic defense up for success against this threat requires a renewed political will and resource commitment, worthy of the past and present sacrifices. Effectively, committing merely 0.25% of GDP annually towards military assistance to Ukraine would provide approximately €120 billion – more than sufficient resources to implement this strategy.
Guided by this reinforced vision and strategy, 2024 will be a year of strategic build-up and defense for both Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic community. It will continue to systematically attrite Russian economy, finances, manpower and equipment, before the pace and outlook of defeat for Russia will rapidly accelerate through 2025 as the United States’ and Europe’s defense-industrial output reaches new levels. With that ever-growing and strengthening resolve, Ukraine will indeed win, and Russia will lose by 2026 the latest.
» სპოილერის ნახვისთვის დააწკაპუნეთ აქ «
We are larger than the task. The sheer size of our collective political, economic and military power should guarantee a victory over Russia. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), also known as the Ramstein group, has a combined GDP of €47 trillion. Total commitment of military aid to Ukraine thus far are around €95 billion – 0.2% of that. At the same time, the combined defence budgets of the Ramstein coalition are more than 13 times greater than Russia’s heavily inflated one: €1.24 trillion against €0.09 trillion in 2023. There should be no doubt in who has the advantage to prevail.
With decisive political will, we can afford to increase both military and economic pressure and bring attrition on the Russian side in the war against Ukraine to a breaking point.
Waging the war in Ukraine costs Russia around a trillion rubles (€10.2 billion per current exchange rate) per month in military expenses alone. Assessments suggest that hidden war-related expenditures veiled under a variety of other categories in the federal budget could account for an extra 30% on top of this, co-funding by regions and private entities further adding to the total. Meanwhile, the Ramstein coalition’s monthly cost of military support averages at €5.3 billion (including still undelivered and multi-year commitments).
Russia’s military budget for 2023, after being doubled mid-year, comprises a third of the entire federal budget. A similar share (29.4%) has been planned for military expenditure in 2024, effectively at the expense of essential state functi0ns such as education, healthcare, infrastructure, and social policy
Most NATO Allies have significantly depleted their already small conventional military stockpiles and capabilities by donating their equipment to Ukraine. This state of affairs is the direct outcome of a decades-long underinvestment in defense. The inability of 20 out of 31 Allies to meet the Defence Investment Pledge to spend at least 2% of GDP is limiting our combined defense budget by €79 billion this year alone12. The total deficit since 2014 amounts to more than €920 billion.
THE TASK
Circumventing Russian defences
Continue to blunt Russian offensive operations
If undisrupted, Russia has the capacity to train approximately 130,000 troops every six months into cohered units and formations available for launching operations sustained rate of attrition of at least 50,000 killed and severely wounded Russian troops per six months to consistently degrade the quality of Russian force, preventing Russia from regenerating offensive combat power which Ukraine has so far successfully achieved.
Economic curtailment of Russian defence industrial output to increase the cost and consequences of military attrition
Raising the cost of the war of aggression by allocating Russia’s confiscated or frozen assets for the benefit of Ukraine
With more than €330 billion frozen by the international community, of which more than €200 billion are controlled by the EU,
it is necessary to create a credible leverage, which would ensure that these funds would not be returned to Russia, unless a full withdrawal from the sovereign territory of Ukraine in its internationally recognized borders is completed and attacks on Ukraine are ceased.
Manpower
Ukraine’s army expanded from 150,000 ground forces to over 700,000 in 2022, while over the course of 2022 there was heavy attrition among experienced fiffiield officers and soldiers alike. As a result, AFU brigades lack sufficiently trained staff officers to enact commander’s intent and synchronize the actions of sub-units laterally. The effective span
of control of a brigade for offensive operations is therefore approximately two companies. The result is that the AFU plans and executes operations with a horizon of exploitation limited to approximately 1200 meters. Furthermore, larger formations are missing or are not structured as combat formations.
training provided by the United States and the greater coalition, the total Western effort since Russia’s full-blown invasion in February 2022 has therefore reached close to 100,000 personnel over 20 months, The 30,000-troop European effort is estimated to have cost slightly over €100 million, placing the total cost estimate as low as approximately €350 million (or €3500 per trained soldier). Because speed mattered, and defensive operations are simpler than offensive operations, training was expedited to five weeks. This is not sufficient to prepare soldiers for offensive operations. It is time for us set new objectives, a new pace and a new standard of quality in training Ukrainian troops. In 2024, the aim should be to expand Ukrainian operations from brigade enabled company actions, to the ability to execute brigade attacks. In 2025, the aim should be for the AFU to conduct simultaneous brigade attacks, enabled by larger formations at a joint level.
There are three critical lines of effort in enabling this expansion of the scale of Ukrainian offensive operations:
1.Staff officers need to be trained to work at brigade and battalion levels to plan, synchronise, and control a greater span of battlespace.
2.Collective training in Europe at a battalion level needs to be expanded and extended to give Ukrainian units that are rotated out the ability to improve their cohesion at echelon.
3. Working with the Ukrainians to continue to develop the command and control tools
Artillery
The EU has delivered around 300,000 out of the one million artillery rounds agreed, in addition to earlier bilateral contributions. The U.S. has provided more than 2,000,000 155mm artillery rounds, complemented by more than a million rounds of other calibers. Ukraine requires a minimum of 200,000 rounds per month to retain localized fire superiority. Sustaining this rate of fire will empty European and U.S. stockpiles over 2024 and will require significant foreign purchases of ammunition. Allies can ramp up their munitions production to meet this rate by 2025 at the latest. While transparency on both European companies’ current production rates as well as planned increases remains limited, estimates based on public data would place the 2023 rate between 480,000 and 700,000 rounds. Current monthly figures could therefore average at 50,000 rounds, doubling the capacity from early 2023. The U.S. has similarly doubled its monthly production since early 2023, now producing 28,000 rounds per month, and aiming to reach the 100,000 per month rate by end of 2025. Meeting Ukraine’s minimum demand rate collectively during 2025 would therefore require a European effort of 140% increase over 2024.
Russia’s total production and recovery of artillery ammunition will reach 3.5 million units in 2023, representing a more than threefold increase from the previous year’s production. In 2024, production and recovery will increase further and would likely reach up to 4.5 million units. This volume significantly exceeds the amount of artillery ammunition available to Ukraine.
As a minimum, industrial investment therefore should aim to provide Ukraine a supply of 8760 GMLRS per year by 2025. To date, Lockheed Martin has produced more than 60,000 in total17, and is aiming to up its current full annual capacity of 10,000 to 14,000 in 202418. With the estimated cost per one rocket approximately €160,000, the total cost of minimum military requirement annually is approximately €1.4 billion.
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რუსეთ-უკრაინის ომი - თემა N90
