ეს ნახეთ, მართლა საინტერესოა.
ინფორმაციული ომის შესახებაა:
The Georgian Cyber “Flood”:
A Model for Future Conflicts?
In August 2008, Russia attacked the nation of
Georgia in a dispute over the Georgian province
of South Ossetia. As the Russian military mounted
its assault on the ground and in the air, a group of
Russian nationalists joined the fray in cyberspace.
Any civilian, Russian-born or otherwise, aspiring
to be a cyber warrior was able to visit pro-
Russia websites to download the software and
instructions necessary to launch denial-of-service
attacks on Georgia. On one Web site, called
StopGeorgia, visitors could download a list of
target Web sites and an automated software
utility. The only effort required by the user was
to enter the Web address of a target and click a
button labelled “Start Flood”.2
The coordinated assault inundated Georgia’s
government and media websites with access
requests. While the effects were minor at first,
with service going down on some websites
sporadically, the denial-of-service attacks became
more severe once the armed hostilities started.
News and government websites were no
longer accessible by anyone within or outside
Georgia, severely hampering Georgia’s public
communications. Russia achieved a significant
psychological victory by preventing Georgia
from disseminating accurate information about
the state of battle to the public. Moreover,
with Georgia’s side of the story silenced, Russia
practically won the battle over international
public opinion by default.
Russia denied any involvement on the part of
its military or government in the cyber attacks.
However, some people were suspicious that
it was solely down to good fortune that the
Russian military began hostilities on the ground
concurrently with an entirely independent civilian
cyber assault. The U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit
(US-CCU), an independent, non-profit research
institute, began monitoring the situation almost
immediately after the attacks, partly to determine
how the campaign was organised. In a recently
released report, the US-CCU concluded that all
of the attackers and activities showed every sign
of being civilian, yet someone in the Russian
government must have given the organisers of the
attacks advanced notice of the timing of Russia’s
military operations.3
Perhaps even more surprising than finding some
level of coordination between Russian officials
and the cyber attackers was that the Russians
may have deliberately chosen to limit the damage
caused by the attacks. No critical infrastructures
were targeted, even though investigations
by the US-CCU suggested that a number of
these infrastructures were vulnerable and could
have been attacked. “The fact that physically
destructive cyber attacks were not carried out
against Georgian critical infrastructure industries
suggests that someone on the Russian side was
exercising considerable restraint", the report says.
Scott Borg, Director of the US-CCU, believes
the Georgia conflict may be a harbinger of how
nation states will orchestrate future cyber attacks.
“People were provided with attack tools, targets
and timing in the Georgia cyber campaign,” Borg
said. “So far this technique has been used in
denial-of-service and other similar attacks. In the
future it will be used to organise people to commit
more devastating attacks.”
http://www.mcafee.com/uk/local_content/rep...y_09_report.pdf 
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ოკუპირებული ტერიტორიები, მოსალოდნელი საფრთხეები-11, დღევანდელი მდგომარეობა, მომავალი ნაბიჯები
