სადესანტო ჯარების სარდალი განიხილავს დზვერვისთვის დელტაპლანების გამყენებასო
Shamanov has resurrected an idea from the Soviet era of VDV forces employing manned hang-gliders. One-man versions could act, he believes, in a reconnaissance role—operating silently and carrying an individual who could see a whole vista, and not just a television screen’s limited image—such as with UAVs.102 Shamanov also wants to see combat motorized hang-gliders. These were also first employed by the Soviet military and, indeed, were used by Georgian forces during the original Abkhazia-Georgia conflict in 1992-1993. Shamanov envisages the VDV having several hundred of these paraplanes (or microlites), with some having both pilot and gunner. The gunner would be present principally as a means to shoot down the types of small UAV that proved invulnerable to Russian countermeasures in Georgia.103
აქაც დავდებ ბარემ. .ასეთ დოკუმენტებს გენშტაბში უნდა სწავლობდნენ დაწვრილებით!
http://www.link.ge/file/371753/The-Russian...ations.pdf.html * * *
აი როგორ ფასდება სადესანტო ჯარების შესაძლებლობები !
There are a number of more general conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis of change in the VDV:
• The VDV forces are the best-trained, most proficient, and most aggressive combat troops of any large formations in the Russian military.
• VDV formations/units have quick-reaction times when called upon to conduct operations.
• The VDV will gain more combat power in absolute terms (with increases in firepower) over the next few years, but it will also become slightly less mobile overall because of increased weight.
• As the VDV starts to receive NCOs from the Ryazan training school (from 2011 onward), the quality of the VDV units will increase (but these NCOs will be few in number).
• The VDV should soon be in receipt of a helicopter force, which will increase its fighting potential.
There are certain capabilities of the VDV troops that need to be highlighted and considered:
• The VDV will shortly have an NCC capability, which should qualitatively increase the divisions’ operational effectiveness.
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• VDV forces will be the first to arrive—in any numbers—in any intervention operation beyond Russia’s borders. The first troops to arrive will probably be those of the GRU spetsnaz or from the VDV’s own 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment (which will be under GRU control). But both will be present only in small numbers and without armor.
• The first wave of VDV troops to arrive in operational zones from any of the four divisions, or from the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade, will be qualitatively better than any follow-on battalions from these same divisions or the brigade. This falloff in quality applies to all the VDV divisions—whether inserted by parachute or conventionally by airlift.
• The “first-to-engage” battalions will be a match for Western forces; the follow-on battalions will more than likely not be.
• If a conventional airlift of VDV forces is conducted into an operational zone and no vehicles arrive with the troops, those troops will more than likely be from the 31st Separate Airborne Brigade.
• If a parachute drop in any numbers is made in an intervention operation, it will probably be by troops from the 98th or 106th Airborne Divisions.
• VDV troops will normally be expected to arrive with their armored vehicles—either by conventional airlift or by being air-dropped. These troops would then have more firepower and protection than any Western airborne forces operating in the same locale.
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• If VDV vehicles are dropped on pallets, they may, if their crews are inside, be ready to fight immediately.
• More wheeled vehicles will soon begin to appear in the inventories of the VDV divisions.
• VDV troops will soon be in receipt of better equipment at the tactical level, which will qualitatively increase their fighting potential (British sniper rifles, for instance).
This post has been edited by Skiamakia on 13 Jan 2012, 19:14 
სასწრაფოდ გასატარებელი ზომები, რუსეთის აგრესიის შესაჩერებლად
