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ჯგუფი: Members
წერილები: 38456
წევრი No.: 27414
რეგისტრ.: 25-December 06
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#61798872 · 22 Dec 2024, 12:25 · · პროფილი · პირადი მიმოწერა · ჩატი
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 1
II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................... 5
III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ........................................................................ 6
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM ............................................................ 8
V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ................................................................................................. 9
VI. VOTING TECHNOLOGIES ....................................................................................................... 11
VII. VOTER RIGHTS AND REGISTRATION ................................................................................. 13
VIII. CANDIDATE RIGHTS AND REGISTRATION ....................................................................... 14
IX. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN ......................................................................................................... 15
X. CAMPAIGN FINANCE ................................................................................................................ 18
A. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE .......................................................................................................... 18
B. DISCLOSURE AND OVERSIGHT ...................................................................................................... 19
XI. MEDIA ........................................................................................................................................... 22
A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................................... 22
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................................... 22
C. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN ........................................................................................ 24
XII. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES .................................................................. 25
XIII. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION ...................................................................................... 26
XIV. ELECTION OBSERVATION ...................................................................................................... 28
XV. ELECTION DAY........................................................................................................................... 29
A. OPENING AND VOTING ................................................................................................................... 29
B. COUNTING AND TABULATION ........................................................................................................ 31
XVI. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................ 32
XVII. RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 35
A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................... 36
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................... 37
ANNEX I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS ............................................................................................. 39
ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION............... 40
ABOUT ODIHR ......................................................................................................................................... 51
GEORGIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 26 October 2024 ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report1 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Following an invitation from the authorities of Georgia and in accordance with its mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the 26 October parliamentary elections. The ODIHR EOM assessed the compliance of the electoral process with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, and national legislation. For election day, the ODIHR EOM was joined by delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to form an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM). In its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on 27 October, the IEOM concluded that while the elections “offered voters a wide choice with 18 candidate lists, they unfolded amid entrenched polarization in an environment marred by concerns over recently adopted legislation, its impact on fundamental freedoms and civil society. Contestants could generally campaign freely while campaign rhetoric and imagery was highly divisive. Reports of pressure on voters, particularly on public sector employees, remained widespread in the campaign. This, coupled with extensive tracking of voters on election day, raised concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution. The legal framework provides an adequate basis for democratic elections, but recent frequent amendments marked a step backwards, raising concerns over its potential use for political gain. Preparations for the elections were well-administered, including extensive voter education on the use of new voting technologies. A significant imbalance in financial resources and advantage of incumbency contributed to an already uneven playing field. The polarized media environment and instrumentalization of private outlets for political propaganda affected impartial news coverage, hindering voters’ ability to make an informed choice. Effectiveness of campaign finance oversight was undermined by limited enforcement, and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalization of the oversight body. The underrepresentation of women on party lists and in the campaign demonstrates a need for greater commitment to ensure adequate involvement in political life. Election day was generally procedurally well-organized and administered in an orderly manner but marked by a tense environment, with frequent compromises in vote secrecy and several procedural inconsistencies, as well as reports of intimidation and pressure on voters that negatively impacted public trust in the process.” Overall, the legal framework provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections. However, it is overly complex, and retains gaps and inconsistencies. Moreover, since 2020, the framework has undergone over 20 revisions, several marking a step backwards, including those adopted shortly before the elections without broad cross-party support. Such frequent and last-minute changes undermined legal stability and raised concerns about potential misuse for political gain, contrary to OSCE commitments and international good practice. While earlier amendments addressed several ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations and were adopted following public consultations, the most recent 2024 amendments including those that abolished the gender quota on parliamentary candidate lists and altered the CEC’s composition and decision-making process to bypass the two-thirds majority requirement in repeat voting, were introduced without an inclusive consultative process or broad political consensus. Several longstanding recommendations from ODIHR and the Venice Commission remained unaddressed, including those related to the impartiality of election administration, comprehensive regulations to prevent misuse of administrative resources, oversight of campaign and campaign finance, media, and electoral dispute resolution. The election administration efficiently managed the technical aspects of the elections. The CEC held regular live-streamed sessions, promptly published all relevant materials online, and organized extensive training and voter information campaigns. However, the public perception of its impartiality was undermined by recent legal amendments that shifted control over the selection and nomination of its members to the ruling party, abolished the opposition-nominated deputy chairperson position, and reduced the requirement for political consensus in its work, as well as perceived links between nonpartisan members and the ruling party. Decision-making within election commissions was not always collegial, with opposition-appointed members raising concerns about limited information sharing and instances of marginalization, including after election day. Allegations of ruling-party affiliation at all levels further eroded public trust. Positively, the CEC took numerous steps to improve the accessibility of the electoral process for persons with disabilities; however, significant issues with accessibility at many polling stations remain unaddressed. For the first time, electronic devices were introduced in most polling stations for voter identification, vote counting, and the transmission of preliminary results. While most stakeholders considered this as a positive measure to increase trust in the integrity of election day proceedings, however, diverting from international good practice the CEC did not give key stakeholders full access to the processes and documentation related to the devices and the respective audit reports were released only after election day, limiting transparency and fuelling concerns about the devices’ vulnerabilities and potential misuse to disclose voter identities. Despite considerable efforts by the election administration to inform voters about the use of new technologies, many voters on election day faced difficulties using electronic devices and were not properly instructed, leading to frequent instances of compromised vote secrecy. Citizens declared legally incapacitated by a court decision and placed in institutional care were denied the right to vote, contrary to international standards. Voters with expired ID documents or without a registered address, who did not have a valid passport either, were excluded from voter lists, at odds with international standards. The CEC offered several options for verifying voter registration data and requesting corrections, both in person and online. While most ODIHR EOM interlocutors did not express significant concerns about the accuracy or inclusiveness of the voter lists before election day, some questioned the legitimacy of multiple registrations at the same addresses involving voters unknown to the actual residents. After election day, the opposition alleged the misuse of voter data, including that of citizens residing abroad. The election administration denied these allegations but declined to provide access to the list of voters who participated, citing the lack of legal provisions. Party and candidate registration was generally inclusive, with the CEC registering 1,184 candidates across 18 political party lists. However, existing restrictions, such as the in-country residency requirement, limitations on individuals deprived of candidacy rights or sentenced to imprisonment by court decision, and the lack of provisions for independent candidacy, are inconsistent with OSCE commitments, international standards, and good practice. In addition, at odds with previous ODIHR recommendations, the official campaign period began more than a month before the conclusion of candidate registration; the overlap of these periods led to disputes over the allocation of free airtime in the media and discrepancies in financial reporting periods. Party programmes largely lacked specific messaging for women, and most parties featured few women in their campaigns. While women constituted a majority in most lower-level election commissions, they made up only 4 of the 17 CEC members. Despite constitutional provisions requiring the state to take special measures to ensure gender equality, legal amendments adopted in 2024 abolished mandatory gender quotas on parliamentary candidate lists. The repeal of this positive measure, combined with existing underrepresentation of women in elected positions, as well as entrenched stereotypes, internal challenges within political parties, and gender-specific threats, had a significant negative impact on women’s political participation. As a result, only 29 percent of party list candidates were women, with most of them in non-electable positions, marking a substantial decrease from the 2020 elections. Among the elected members of parliament, 34 are women, representing a 23 percent of the total. Contestants were generally able to campaign freely, and 18 candidate lists competed in a subdued campaign. However, reports of intimidation, coercion, inducement and pressure on voters, especially public sector employees and the economically vulnerable persisted, raising concerns about the ability of some voters to freely form their opinions and cast their votes without fear of retribution, at odds with OSCE commitments and international standards. Campaign rhetoric and imagery were highly divisive, and both ruling and opposition parties reported isolated incidents of violence, event disruptions, and damage to campaign materials. Representatives of the ruling party made public statements about their plans to ban the key opposition parties, including by applying to the Constitutional Court, contrary to the principle of democratic pluralism. Campaigning by high-level and local officials, financial incentives for diverse social groups as well as a government amnesty programme, while not against the law, provided an undue advantage of incumbency, and questioned the government’s genuine commitment to preventing voter influence through state resources. The ruling party held a significant financial advantage over its competitors in terms of state funding, private donations, and campaign spending. The 2023 legal amendments reduced the annual expenditure cap for political parties and prohibited donations from legal entities, addressing some previous ODIHR recommendations; however, issues related to third-party campaigning and the absence of the legally prescribed publication of the oversight body’s conclusions before election day remain unaddressed. Legislative shortcomings and inconsistent enforcement undermined the transparency and effectiveness of party and campaign finance oversight, now overseen by the newly established Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) since 2023. The ACB’s application of legal provisions was selective and inconsistent, particularly in designating certain civil society organizations as entities “with a declared electoral goal”, subjecting them to the same financial regulations as electoral contestants. These designations were later withdrawn following a government request, raising concerns about political interference in the ACBs operations. The media landscape is diverse yet highly polarized, with much of its funding tied to party-affiliated individuals, undermining independent news production and contrary to international standards. The safety of journalists remains a major concern, highlighted by a number of recent assaults, acts of intimidation, and pressure on them, including on election day. The narrow interpretation of restrictive campaign provisions by the media regulator and the courts resulted in sanctions against broadcasters and limited opposition parties’ ability to campaign in the media. The ODIHR EOM media monitoring revealed clear political bias across all monitored TV stations, with commercial television not implementing legal obligations for impartial news coverage. The public broadcaster covered all parties predominantly in a positive or neutral tone but devoted significantly more time to the ruling party in the news. The instrumentalization of commercial television for political propaganda undermined independent journalism and amplified divisive political rhetoric. In addition, the absence of impartial analysis of party programmes and the refusal by key political actors to participate in debates challenged voters’ ability to make an informed choice. While the law provides for remedies for election disputes, the effectiveness of dispute resolution remained limited due to restrictions on voters’ legal standing, procedural shortcomings, ambiguities in the legislation and inconsistencies in its application. Before election day, more than 200 complaints were filed with election commissions regarding the appointment and operation of Precinct Election Commissions (PECs), alleged misuse of administrative resources, and campaign violations. Most decisions were made by election commission chairpersons rather than the full commissions, undermining collegiality and reducing transparency, contrary to prior ODIHR recommendations. Many complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated, often without adequate investigation of the merits. The trust in the law enforcement, the election administration, and the judiciary to effectively and impartially adjudicate politically sensitive matters remained low throughout the electoral period. The law provides for election observation by citizen and international observers, contributing to a vibrant observation scene. However, the adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, along with the threat of sanctions for non-compliance, although the latter not used before the elections, had a stigmatizing effect on many organizations. This coupled with reported incidents of attacks and intimidation, has impacted their ability to operate in an environment free from undue pressure. Further, some groups faced targeted discrediting efforts by state authorities and ruling party structures, being labelled as foreign or opposition agents, aimed at undermining their credibility. On election day, several citizen observer groups reported instances of intimidation against their representatives, obstacles to their work, and the presence of individuals at polling stations registered as observers who acted on behalf of contestants, mainly the ruling party. Procedurally, election day was generally orderly administered but marked by a tense atmosphere and widespread intimidation of voters, as well as of citizen observers. ODIHR observers noted numerous indications of pressure on voters, reports of many voters feeling pressured, tracking by ruling party structures and affiliates, and overcrowding at many polling stations. In numerous cases, 24 per cent of observations, vote secrecy was potentially compromised due to the manner of ballot insertion into ballot boxes, inadequate polling station layouts, and marks visible on the back of ballots. Additionally, ruling party representatives frequently video-recorded the voting process, which may have had an intimidating effect on voters. The counting process revealed procedural omissions, including improper handling of unused ballots, failure to announce votes aloud, and inconsistencies in determining ballot validity. Handling of results protocols at District Election Commissions (DECs) was inconsistent. While preliminary results were promptly published online by the CEC, key data, such as voter turnout per polling station and the number of invalid votes, were not made available in a user-friendly format. Following the release of preliminary results, the opposition rejected the outcome, citing irregularities such as voter intimidation, vote buying, and alleged foreign interference. In the following days, citizen observer organizations and the opposition claimed that these irregularities pointed to coordinated manipulation, while the government, the ruling party, and the CEC denied these claims. Over 1,200 complaints were filed by parties and observer organizations, but most were dismissed by DECs after limited investigation, with courts upholding the majority of these decisions following minimal scrutiny of the cases. Appeals against electoral results submitted to the CEC, courts, and the Constitutional Court were dismissed. Overall, the handling of post-election day complaints by election commissions and courts undermined the right to due process, failed to provide an effective remedy, and did not comprehensively address widespread concerns about the integrity of election results. All elected opposition members of the parliament relinquished their seats or boycotted the opening session. Further, of serious concern, starting in late November, demonstrations against a government decision to postpone EU negotiation talks led to violent clashes with law enforcement and mass-arrests, challenging protesters’ rights to freedom of assembly and deepening the political crisis. On 14 December, a GDdominated electoral college elected Mikheil Kavelashvili as president amid ongoing protests, with President Zourabichvili, the opposition, and civil society rejecting the legitimacy of the process. This report offers a number of recommendations to support efforts to bring elections in Georgia closer in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. Priority recommendations include preventing voter intimidation, pressure on public employees, vote buying, and electoral violence; undertaking a comprehensive legislative review to align the legal framework with international standards; revising the appointment process for election commission members to prevent dominance by any single political party and fully ensure efficiency; developing clear regulations for political finance oversight; introducing measures to ensure the independence of the media regulatory body; ensuring efficiency and transparency in election dispute resolution; allowing for citizen observers to operate without pressure or intimidation; and guaranteeing vote secrecy through procedural safeguards. ODIHR stands ready to assist in addressing immediate post-election concerns and working to improve future elections by addressing the recommendations contained in this and previous reports, including through a comprehensive review of the electoral legislation.
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